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WHO IS TO JUDGE?* 
Hans Oberdiek 
Swarthmore College 
The title of this paper-"Who Is to Judge?"-might just as well be, "Whose to 
Judge?": that is, whose right and/or responsibility is it to judge? That this is so 
will, I hope, become clear in what follows. 
The question, Who is to Judge? is seldom a genuine request for an answer. 
Rather, it is usually intended rhetorically, implying that no one can or ought to 
judge. Precisely what is implied, however, is often unclear. It may mask a claim 
that no one ever has any right to judge anything. Alternatively, it may be a claim 
that no one is ever in any position to judge anything. Or perhaps it claims that 
there are never any acceptable standards or principles one may use in judging. 
Finally, it may be a way of claiming that there are no acceptable procedures one 
may use in judging. 
Considered as unrestricted claims, each of these is clearly and obviously false. 
Individuals often have a legal right-sometimes, indeed, a legal duty-to judge. 
In legal disputes between states, for instance, federal courts have the legal right 
and duty to settle the dispute. Moreover, people are often in a good-sometimes 
ideal-position to judge. They may occupy this position through training, as in 
the case of those who grade apples and oranges; through designated position, as in 
the case of umpires; through experience, as in the case of connoisseurs of wine; or 
through sheer (bad) luck, as in the case of a witness to an accident. Naturally, 
these positions are not exclusive: a surgeon may be in a good position to know 
what needs to be removed from a patient because of his training, designated 
position at the operating table, and experience. Analogous considerations would 
demonstrate the falsity of the other two possible contentions. 
Those who rhetorically ask, Who is to Judge? will protest that they never 
intended their claims to have an unrestricted range. Rather, they will continue, 
they mean them to extend only to moral and nonconventional value judgments. 
And that is fair enough, though it would be worthwhile to ask why ethics should 
*An earlier version of this paper was read at the University of Florida in April 1975. I am 
grateful to the Ring Committee on Social Ethics for giving me the opportunity to deliver this paper 
and to those in the audience who provided instructive and helpful criticisms. 
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be singled out for special treatment. I suspect we would find an implicit, if not 
explicit, appeal to certain au courant notions; namely, that the gulf separating facts 
from values, 'is' from 'ought,' prevents moral utterances from being anything 
more than expressions of emotion or expressions of personal (or social) commit- 
ment. 
Ignoring these suspicions, let us look instead at the alternative claims masked 
by the question, Who is to Judge?: First, no one ever has any moral right to judge 
the rightness or wrongness, goodness or badness, of any act, policy, state of affairs, 
or institution; second, no one is ever in any position to make a reasoned moral 
judgment; third, there are no reasonable, justifiable moral standards, principles, 
rules, or criteria one may use in making moral judgments; and, fourth, there are no 
reasonable, justifiable procedures for settling moral disputes or for solving moral 
problems. 
Each of these claims has distinct assumptions and implications, and therefore 
distinct arguments can be urged for and against each. The third, for instance, 
entails that no moral assertion is well grounded, though this is not entailed by 
either the first or second contention. Or, to consider another example, one might 
argue that there are sound moral principles but that the complexity of human 
affairs is such that no one can apply them with any assurance, hence no one has 
any moral right to judge. The point is simply that each claim, its assumptions, 
implications, and supporting arguments, must be distinguished if progress is to be 
made in determining the scope and soundness of the contentions embodied in the 
rhetorical question before us. The meaning and scope of the first two claims, for 
example, require further clarification. I shall construe both as silent regarding 
one's moral right to make judgments on moral matters; that is, neither states nor 
implies that one may or may not say, believe, or think that X is right or wrong, 
good or bad. Rather, I shall construe both as holding that no one has a moral right 
to determine the outcome of any moral matter; that is, both imply that no one has 
a moral right to permit, require, or prevent any action or policy on purely moral 
grounds. Thus, it might be contended that a teacher has the right to require a 
student to read a certain book, provided that the grounds are educational, but that 
no one has any right to require anyone to read anything if one's grounds are 
merely moral. 
Each claim before us must be met, and met squarely. However, they cannot 
be met at once, all at once, or once and for all, since, as we have seen already, each 
involves varied, complex, and far-reaching issues. I shall confine myself to a 
consideration of how these claims might be countered in a specific instance. 
We humans wear out, and when we do, we die. Sometimes, however, only a 
part of us wears out or is damaged, the rest of us remaining in passable condition. 
Yet if a vital organ is involved, death is almost certain to follow, unless we can be 
provided with one or more spare parts. Here there is some good news and some 
bad news. The good news is that spare parts, both artificial and natural, are 
available for use; the bad news is that there are not now and perhaps never will be 
enough spare parts-or adequate funding-to go around. Consequently, many 
people die each year who would live if only there were enough artificial kidney 
machines, kidneys, hearts, lungs, and other lifesaving devices and organs. Thus the 
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problem must be faced of determining who is to live and who is to die. It is to this 
problem, the problem of allocation, that one is likely to hear the rhetorical re- 
sponse, But who is to judge? 
One answer to this latter question is good as far as it goes, and, philosophi- 
cally, it goes pretty far. The question is not so much who shall judge, but how 
should anyone judge? That is, what principles and criteria are morally relevant in 
determining who should receive scarce lifesaving organs and devices? Once we 
determine how any of us is to judge, that is, once we determine correct or justifi- 
able standards of judgment, then the question of who is to judge will fade in 
importance, for presumably a substantial number of people will be able to apply 
such standards with roughly uniform results. 
As I say, philosophically this answer goes pretty far. Mathematicians and 
scientists are seldom asked, Who is to judge what the implications of Godel's 
theorem are? or Who is to judge whether aerosol sprays disturb the ozone layer? 
The proper response is that any competent and informed mathematician or scien- 
tist can judge provided, of course, that he or she knows the correct standards to 
employ; if there are no correct standards, or if there is great controversy regarding 
them, then at best one can only make an informed guess. Mathematicians and 
scientists therefore strive to formulate or discover correct standards of judgment. 
A modified form of this direct approach is not out of place in ethics. Indeed, 
it is evidenced in recent published contributions to discussions regarding abortion, 
civil disobedience, affirmative action, the allocation of scarce resources, and other 
contemporary social -issues. That is, an attempt is made to establish a sound, 
justifiable set of criteria for determining if and under what conditions certain 
kinds of acts or policies may be vindicated. After decades during which philoso- 
phers confined themselves almost exclusively to metaethical issues, this devel- 
opment is as welcome as it is refreshing. 
But social practices and institutions change more slowly than individual be- 
liefs, a fact which is well known and, on the whole, desirable. As a consequence, 
however, exclusive reliance on the direct approach may have little effect, for those 
with effective control of practices and institutions may not hear, take notice, or 
accept the conclusions of those social critics out of power. I shall therefore adopt 
a less direct route in supplementing-but not replacing-the more direct route in 
the hope that the two together will be more effective in bringing about desirable 
social change. At the same time, I hope to go some distance in countering the four 
claims discussed and listed above. 
If, for the time being only, we set aside questions of how we are to decide 
who shall receive scarce lifesaving devices and organs, do we have an answer to 
those who ask, Who is to judge? Although physicians are not the sole judges of 
who gets what in these matters at present, certainly their judgment carries the 
greatest weight; for the most part, indeed, in making a judgment a physician (or a 
group of physicians) will be passing judgment. We must not deceive ourselves: 
moral judgments determining who shall live and who shall die are, will be, and 
must be made. There is no alternative. 
Some may deny that physicians are either making or passing moral judg- 
ments; rather, it may be argued, all judgments are, can, and should be purely 
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medical and scientific, not moral. Now it is incontrovertible that judgments, and 
therefore decisions, regarding the allocation of scarce lifesaving devices and organs 
involve purely medical matters. But if one concludes from this that such judg- 
ments belong solely to physicians, then one may just as well argue that the 
question of capital punishment would be best left to electrical and chemical 
engineers! 
To maintain the myth that questions regarding the allocation of scarce re- 
sources, whether in medicine, economics, or elsewhere, are purely or even primar- 
ily technical and scientific is comforting, because we can avoid responsibility for 
their answers, since few of us are technicians or scientists. But to hide from our 
responsibility in this way is not only "bad faith"; it is also bad judgment and 
worse policy, as it effectivly prevents us from examining our policies and practices 
from an examined moral point of view. If we persist in masking the moral 
dimensions of problems of allocation, we can hardly hope to arrive at their satis- 
factory solution, for no problem can be solved if it is persistently misdescribed. 
After conceding this much, it may still be contended that, since allocation 
problems are problems for physicians, physicians alone should solve them. Again, 
it is incontrovertible that allocative problems are problems for physicians, and they 
no doubt feel them more keenly and acutely than most of us. They are not, 
however, merely problems for physicians; they are equally, if not more so, prob- 
lems for those affected, their families, and-though to a lesser extent-everyone 
else. They are, in short, social problems. Notice, moreover, that anyone advocating 
this line of defense is smuggling in his own moral predilections, for implicit in 
this defense is the claim that only those for whom X is an acutely felt moral 
problem have a moral right or are in a position to resolve it. Even if this were so, 
which arguably it is not, it would seem to imply that prospective users of scarce 
medical resources should have a loud voice in determining criteria of allocation, as 
they, above all, are acutely affected by any criteria that determine who shall get 
how much of what. One reason questions of allocation seem to be peculiarly 
problems for physicians is simply that physicians now possess virtually unchal- 
lenged power to answer them. 
Here it may be appropriate to say that nothing in this paper should be 
construed as. a harangue against physicians. For the most part they have acted more 
decently than the rest of us, since they recognized from the beginning that hard 
moral decisions cannot be avoided, and they have not shrunk from the inordinate 
burden of responsibility our unwillingness has thrust upon them. Because the 
burden is inordinate, however, what was not particularly sought by physicians in 
the first place must be shared by more of us. No matter how much we reclaim 
abdicated responsibility, physicians will continue to carry heavy responsibilities. 
There may be those who still cling to the belief that physicians alone should 
decide questions of allocation on the ground that, in these matters, physicians 
alone are authorities. But this is simply a confusion. Granted that a board-certified 
physician is an authority in his particular specialty, it is a non sequitur to conclude 
that he is an authority on any moral aspects of allocative questions. Indeed, it is 
doubtful that anyone could be an authority in the requisite sense. The difficulty is 
not that there are no correct or acceptable criteria; in large part the difficulty has 
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to do with what it is to be an authority. One authority on the concept of authority 
writes: "A person is an authority in virtue of possessing extensive knowledge of a 
field or subject-matter. There seem to be no limits on what the field or subject- 
matter can be. . . . But the knowledge. . . must form a connected whole ... 
which has sufficient unity that it can be given a name."' 
While there can be and in fact are authorities on ethical theory, and on the 
issues involved in a given moral problem, it does not follow that anyone is an 
authority on, say, the morality of abortion, the limits of justified civil disobedi- 
ence, or the proper distribution of health services. Of course, one can and should 
become informed regarding the multiplicity of issues comprising moral problems, 
yet even complete information, whatever that might mean, would not be sufficient 
to transform one into a moral expert or authority. What more is required will not 
be discussed here. Even if there are no moral authorities in the requisite sense, 
however, it does not follow that moral- judgments are necessarily vacuous or 
unfounded or untrue. Only when there exists a broad, unified, and widely shared 
network of moral beliefs and ethical theory does the notion of a moral authority 
make much sense. Perhaps such networks have existed in times past; certainly 
none exist now. Moral and evaluative judgments can nonetheless be meaningful, 
well grounded, and true for all of that: we simply will not have the luxury of any 
shortcut appeal to authority. In holding that there are no (present) moral authori- 
ties, one need not deny that the judgment of certain individuals deserves great 
weight. Some people, because of their experience, training, integrity, and other 
virtues of character, intellect, and insight, appear to have an extraordinary grasp of 
moral issues-even when the reasons adduced for their judgments do not seem 
especially persuasive. Why this appears to be so must be left for another occasion. 
Yet even if one could become a moral authority in the requisite sense, there 
is little reason to believe that physicians would be in a particularly good position 
to become moral authorities. The years of training and experience required to 
become a skilled clinician often rob physicians of time to think through complicat- 
ed moral issues; they are rightly preoccupied with thinking through complicated 
medical issues. 
Why, then, are physicians often accepted as moral authorities regarding the 
allocation of scarce lifesaving devices and organs? At least part of the answer lies 
in the fact that a physician is normally in authority as well as being an authority: 
"A person is in authority by virtue of occupying a position or office in a social 
institution with an hierarchial structure."2 Now we need not quarrel with the fact 
that physicians are in authority, that is, that they hold positions of authority 
regarding purely medical matters. Ideally, a physician is in authority because he or 
she is an authority on medical matters. If one acknowledges that no physician- 
just as no philospher-is a moral authority, then one must question why any 
physician should be in authority over allocative questions which are primarily and 
essentially moral. 
1. Gary Young, "Authority," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 Uune 1974): 563. 
2. Ibid., p. 564. 
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I shall mention, though only in passing, a further explanation for the fact 
that physicians are frequently accepted as moral authorities. It can be traced in part 
to what Max Weber calls charismatic authority: authority resting on "devotion to 
the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individ- 
ual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him".' 
To this may be added the propensity of man to respect the moral and political 
judgments of those who possess arcane knowledge or wield great power. So physi- 
cians, regardless of their own preferences, are often miscast in the leading role of 
moral authorities. 
One might accept all or most of what has been said thus far, yet persist in 
maintaining that no one has a right to make moral judgments or that no one is in 
a position to pass moral judgment, especially if there are no moral authorities. Yet 
it is not clear how this could be made out. It might be argued that if physicians 
have no moral right to judge, then, since physicians are not alone in not being 
moral authorities, no one has any right to judge. But this is morally absurd. If no 
one has a moral right to judge, then no one ought to judge; consequently, available 
but scarce spare parts ought not be distributed at all. And this is as unjustified as 
it is silly, for the absence of moral authorities does not entail the absence of moral 
rights. In the kind of case before us it is imperative that we establish a system of 
such rights just because the consequences of denying any individual or group the 
moral right to judge would be disastrous. The question then becomes, Who shall 
be granted the moral and legal right to judge, and on what grounds? Or, as was 
stated at the outset, Whose is it to judge? 
Clearly, everyone's interests are involved to some extent, and potentially 
everyone's interests are involved to a large extent, for anyone may need a spare 
part or two before wearing out altogether. Now if the concept of a moral right has 
any validity, then everyone (or nearly everyone) is eligible to judge, in the sense of 
possessing a moral right to pass judgment, that is, to affect individual conduct, 
social practices, and institutions. For suppose that no one possessed a moral right 
to pass judgment. On this supposition the very concept of a moral right would 
lose signification: nothing can be a right which does not entitle someone to affect 
conduct, practices, or institutions. Indeed, the only reason to maintain that ev- 
eryone has a right to hold moral views is that we wish to protect one's ability to 
affect the thought and action of oneself and others. After all, we need not invoke 
the majestic concept of the right to protect one's ability to hold moral views 
simpliciter: everyone holds moral beliefs regardless of any right to do so. 
An ethical system may of course be devised which dispenses with the concept 
of a right altogether, and it is sometimes maintained that the ancient Greeks did 
just that. Perhaps, though it is risky to infer from the fact that ancient Greek has 
no term which readily translates as 'rights' that the Greeks had no concept of 
rights. Certainly they believed that there were what may be called 'entitlements' to 
action, political office, and property with clearly demarcated limits: citizens, met- 
3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and 
Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 324 ff. 
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ics, women, and slaves possessed distinct sets of entitlements, for example. And, as 
Socrates never questioned, Athenian juries were certainly entitled to pass judgment 
on a variety of matters which came before them. It is true that Athenians do not 
appear to have had a place in their system for individual rights, but that does not 
show that they lacked a concept of individual rights, let alone any concept of 
rights whatever. Whether or not Athenians or other ancient Greeks had a concept 
of rights similar to ours, it does appear that their conceptual system was rich 
enough to fulfill the central functions rights serve. In particular, every society 
must have some way of determining who is eligible to judge fundamental issues 
and on what grounds. While this is normally accomplished through legal systems 
in complex societies, only if these legal systems are morally grounded do they 
deserve our respect, support, and compliance. And our system of legal rights is 
grounded, in part, by appeal to moral rights. 
Obviously, from the premise that nearly everyone is eligible to have a right 
to judge it does not follow that everyone actually possesses that right, for then 
nothing would ever be decided and that would be self-defeating. A somewhat 
analogous situation obtains in law. Nearly everyone is eligible to have the right to 
sit on a jury, though only a handful of people actually possess that right in any 
given case. But can there be anything like a jury to pass on moral issues raised in 
connection with the allocation of scarce lifesaving devices and organs, and, if so, 
how might it work? These questions must be faced, for perhaps the main reason 
physicians alone now have the right and duty to judge is simple and persuasive: no 
one has come up with a better alternative. 
Here is one alternative. In each state a special Lay Allocation Board would be 
charged with developing a set of normative (as opposed to medical) criteria physi- 
cians must use in selecting those who may receive scarce lifesaving devices and 
organs. Medical considerations could not be completely excluded from consider- 
ation, of course, as degree of medical risk might well be thought appropriate to 
take into account when spare parts are especially scarce. The envisaged allocation 
board would have an advisory staff much as a congressional committee does. 
Solicited and unsolicited position papers would be considered from interested 
individuals and groups, and open hearings might be held from time to time. The 
board itself might wish to publish its own tentative position papers as its delibera- 
tions progressed. In due course, after the committee's final recommendations had 
been promulgated and time provided for challenges to them, the board's criteria of 
allocation would become binding. 
Much more obviously needs to be said. Precisely which procedures are adopt- 
ed by the board is extremely important, for instance, because procedures influence 
outcome. Although little more will be said, a brief discussion of the board's 
composition may be helpful. Clearly, every member ought to be disinterested; that 
is, like an ideal judge or umpire, no board member should have a vested interest 
in the outcome of the board's deliberations or decisions. Moreover, each member 
would have to possess the intelligence and capacity to understand the medical, 
moral, and social ramifications of alternative sets of criteria. Beyond these, there 
are other characteristics one would naturally look for: the ability to think clearly, 
to articulate one's reasons for and against alternative proposals, to stick by one's 
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convictions without being bullheaded, and so on. In general, one would look for 
the sort of intelligence, integrity, and judgment required of anyone in a position of 
great responsibility. 
Board members would also have to have the capacity, ability, and willingness 
to put themselves in a position where they can become competent to judge. 
Plausibility is lent to the claim that no one is ever in any position to make 
reasoned moral judgments because too often we are satisfied to make casual, 
uninformed, and therefore irresponsible judgments. As becoming competent en- 
tails becoming informed, board members would be required to review and discuss 
case studies, interview physicians, and acquaint themselves with popular, religious, 
and philosophic literature on the subject. 
Finally, board members should represent more than one sex, race, religious 
denomination, and socioeconomic class, for assumptions one brings to moral deli- 
berations are often unconsciously biased. A case in point may be found in the 
British MedicalJournal of March 11, 1967, where Dr. M. A. Wilson asserts that in 
selecting patients for haemodialysis, "gainful employment in a well chosen occupa- 
tion is necessary to achieve the best results" since "only the minority wish to live 
on charity."4 It is arguable, I suppose, that the gainfully employed offer the best 
medical risks, but it is evident that Wilson has something quite different in mind. 
One can only attribute such errant nonsense to class bias or some similar prejudice. 
Now one can imagine, though only barely, some board of allocation incorporating 
Wilson's pronouncement into their own set of allocative criteria, but at least it 
would be out in the open and subject to challenge, legal and otherwise. As things 
now stand, decisions may be made on the basis of widely divergent subjective 
views of physicians with only a slight chance that their views may be challenged 
or even known, save for an occasional colleague. 
In requiring that board members represent diverse backgrounds, it should not 
be thought that they are to represent their backgrounds. One can be representative 
of a group without being its representative. The reason for requiring broad repre- 
sentation is not that members should serve as appointed representatives of their 
natural constituencies. Far from it. Board members must think for themselves, and 
not think of themselves as representing any special interest group. The primary 
reason for requiring broad representation is that one's perspective is often influ- 
enced, for good or ill, by one's background. 
In addition to the board of allocation, hospitals which authorize spare-part 
surgery and treatment must have a review panel with the power and responsibility 
to see that the criteria are understood, instituted, and followed. At least one-third 
of such panels should be laymen and at least one member should be an attorney 
experienced in the area of medical law. The remaining members could be staff 
physicians. These panels could also recommend changes to its parent board of 
allocation. 
Needless to say, the foregoing is merely a sketch. And no doubt the criteria 
4. J. D. N. Nabarro, F. M. Parsons, R. Shakman, and M. A. Wilson, "Selection of Patients 
for Haemodialysis," British Medical Journal (March 11, 1967), p. 623; quoted in Rescher (n. 5 
below). 
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of allocation eventually decided upon would be imperfect. But imperfection itself 
implies objectivity, for where there is no objectivity there is neither perfection nor 
imperfection. Any set of criteria will have its critics: criticism may come from 
those who believe that their interests and concerns have been slighted or ignored 
altogether; from those who express minority moral points of view; or from those 
who believe that the proposed criteria are vague, ambiguous, needlessly cumber- 
some, or otherwise unworkable. Such criticism must be met forthrightly, and that 
should not be an impossibility: to meet criticism does not mean to satisfy one's 
critics-it means to give a reasoned justification for one's policies. 
In defense of my proposal, I shall consider a few prima facie objections 
which might be lodged against it; there are undoubtedly more. 
1. "Choosing board members will become a political football because the 
AMA and other pressure groups will have a vested and intense interest in how the 
members will be chosen and who will choose them." The composition of alloca- 
tion boards could become a political football, though it is unlikely, in that any 
game played with this particular football would almost certainly end in a loss for 
all sides! Still, it is a genuine danger which must be guarded against. Perhaps one 
safeguard would be to have the governor, along with legislative leaders from each 
major party, select among candidates recommended by responsible religious, educa- 
tional, and social organizations, such as labor unions. A further safeguard would be 
to appoint board members for three- to five-year nonrenewable terms. While such 
boards would have some of the functions of our regulatory agencies, they would 
have quite different concerns and fewer temptations. They would be less likely to 
be faced, for example, with constantly shifting economic conditions, nor would 
they be faced with known sums of money or known beneficiaries of their deci- 
sions; and finally, it is unlikely that they would be faced with conflicts of interest. 
One last point. We need not fear any great bureaucracy emerging from my propos- 
al: we need only the board, its research and secretarial staff, and the various review 
panels. 
2. "By laying down binding criteria, allocation boards will, in effect, pass 
down death sentences on individuals who are not permitted their day in court. 
Further, physicians will find themselves straitjacketed by an anonymous board." 
There is more emotion in this objection than reason. First, any selection proce- 
dure-whether conducted by a physician or a board-involves, or may involve, 
denying lifesaving help to some. The only difference is that this fact is now pretty 
well hidden from public view. By making allocative criteria public, everyone will 
have a clearer idea of where they stand. 
There is no reason, second, why someone who felt wronged could not appeal, 
at least to the review panel. Even now a disgruntled patient (or his heirs!) can 
bring suit if he believes that he has been denied what is legally his. Under present 
conditions, however, one who is rejected as a recipient of a lifesaving device or 
organ has little if any opportunity to appeal his physician's decision and so is also 
denied his day in court. 
Finally, there is no reason to believe that physicians will be straitjacketed, for 
there is no reason to believe that all manner of discretion will be taken from them. 
We should not assume that allocative boards would even be tempted to adopt 
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complex and highly restrictive criteria. John Stuart Mill once remarked that any 
moral principle would work badly if we supposed universal idiocy to be conjoined 
to it! The same is true of proposals for social reform. Surely boards of allocation 
would seek to establish relatively simple, plausible, and enforceable criteria that are 
likely to win high acceptance and therefore compliance among physicians and the 
public generally. 
3. "No matter how just their criteria, the proposed boards of allocation would 
serve only to hide the main problem: namely, the refusal of our state and national 
governments to spend what it should on medical care. To set up criteria of 
allocation makes it look as if lifesaving devices and even organs are necessarily in 
scarce supply, when in fact there could be more than enough to go around if only 
the government stepped in with adequate funding for research, development, and 
treatment." There is a great deal of merit in this objection. Nevertheless, there is 
nothing incompatible with establishing allocative criteria and working for funda- 
mental social change. Moreover, the publicity allocation boards would engender is 
one way of bringing our inadequate funding of medical care to the attention of the 
public and its legislators. Further, if a modified lottery were adopted as a method 
of selection, even the wealthy would have an interest in seeing to it that funda- 
mental changes in the financing of medical care were undertaken. Recall that once 
a lottery replaced college deferments in our draft system, both college students and 
their parents took a far greater interest in the Vietnam War. Last, while kidney 
machines may someday become as plentiful and inexpensive as power lawn mow- 
ers, it is unlikely that hearts, lungs, kidneys, or eyes will become plentiful. It is 
therefore unrealistic to suppose that we shall ever be so fortunate that allocative 
problems disappear. 
I believe that a set of principles can be formulated and defended that meet 
reasonable standards of acceptability, and that these principles will emerge as the 
envisaged boards of allocation progress in their deliberations. As Nicholas Rescher 
points out, any reasonable selection procedure "must be simple enough to be readily 
intelligible, and it must be plausible, that is, patently reasonable in a way that can 
be apprehended easily and without involving ramified subtleties." Without going 
into great detail, it might be useful to discuss Rescher's own suggestions, especial- 
ly since they appear to violate his own regulative requirements. 
According to Rescher, two distinguishable types of criteria are needed: criteria 
of inclusion and criteria of comparison. "We can think of the selection as being 
made by a two stage process: (1) the selection from among all possible candidates 
(by a suitable screening process) of a group to be taken under serious consider- 
ation as candidates for therapy, and then (2) the actual singling out, within this 
group, of the particular individuals to whom therapy is to be given. Thus the first 
process narrows down the range of comparative choice by eliminating en bloc 
whole categories of potential candidates. The second process calls for a more 
refined, case-by-case comparison of those candidates that remain."6 This is exactly 
5. Nicholas Rescher, "The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy," Ethics 79 
(April 1969): 175; reprinted in Ethics and Public Policy, edited by Tom L. Beauchamp (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1975), pp. 425-41. 
6. Ibid., p. 175. 
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one stage too many: the second stage calls for implausibly refined judgments. 
Reasonable grounds can be provided for excluding those who are critically ill with 
other diseases, psychologically unable (or unwilling) to cope with the tremendous 
stress involved in organ transplants and continuing renal dialysis, or very elderly. 
Similarly, reasonable grounds can be provided for including those whose prospects 
are particularly good, children and parents of children under twenty-one, and those 
who need only the temporary use of kidney machines. No doubt there are a few 
other reasonable criteria of inclusion. But to suggest that case-by-case comparisons 
be made within a pool of selected candidates supposes principles, standards, and 
criteria that simply cannot be established. 
Two of Rescher's proposed criteria of comparison are clearly untenable: nei- 
ther can be adequately formulated nor justly applied. In the course of defending 
what he calls "the potential future-contributions factor," Rescher argues: 
In "choosing to save" one life rather than another, "the society," through the mediation of the 
particular medical institution in question . . . is clearly warranted in considering the likely pattern of 
future services to be rendered by the patient (adequate recovery assumed), considering his age, talent, 
training, and past record of performance. In its allocations of ELT [Exotic Lifesaving Therapy], 
society "invests" a scarce resource in one person as against another and is thus entitled to look to the 
probable prospective "return" on its investment. . . . The fact that the standard is difficult to apply 
is certainly no reason for not attempting to apply it. The problem of ELT selection is inevitably 
burdened with difficult standards.7 
As "a morally necessary correlative" of the above prospective service criterion, 
Rescher would add a retrospective service criterion, mainly on grounds of equity 
(though he believes that a utilitarian defense could also be attempted).8 
Now in deciding to support the research, capital investment, salaries, and 
treatment costs involved in ELT, we must indeed ask whether our investment of 
time, talent, and money might not be better spent. Arguably, we ought to spend 
more on prevention of various pedestrian causes of death and ill health than on 
exotic lifesaving therapies. Even assuming that conventional methods of preven- 
tion and treatment need not suffer because of expensive exotic therapies, the 
demand for replacement of vital organs will continue to outstrip the supply for the 
indefinite future, thus leaving us with acute problems of allocation. Yet this fact 
should not lead us to embrace either of Rescher's criteria. We need only adopt 
criteria for candidate inclusion, for example, prospect of success, life expectancy, 
and family responsibilities. Should these criteria not sufficiently drain the candi- 
date pool, then a lottery could be employed. In using a lottery, we would at once 
recognize the limits of human judgment and objectivity, lessen the likelihood of 
arbitrary and invidious distinctions, and diminish the amount of special pleading. 
There is little need to belabor the virtues of a lottery over Rescher's proposed 
criteria. As our most recent experience with the draft demonstrated, everyone has 
grounds for claiming exemption-everyone, that is, except he who is poor, illiter- 
ate, or otherwise disadvantaged. This is not to say that everyone is equally deserv- 
ing of having his life saved. It is only to say that any institutional (or individual) 
attempt to determine whose services to society, prospective or retrospective, are 
7. Ibid., p. 178. 
8. Ibid., p. 179. 
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more deserving imposes an impossible burden. (Nor need we fear that a lottery 
within the candidate pool would exclude a president, admiral, senator, or director 
of the Manhattan Project; whether justifiable or not, every system manages to find 
a way of providing for such cases.) 
The foregoing is not intended as a definitive statement regarding acceptable 
and unacceptable criteria; it is merely a preliminary and cursory discussion of a few 
obvious issues and classifications boards of allocation would surely consider. The 
boards themselves would have the task of determining selection criteria, enforce- 
ment, and appeal procedures. But perhaps enough has been said to show that 
reasonable criteria and procedures can be formulated and defended which would 
also meet with public acceptance. Even if the outcomes of the various boards' 
deliberations are not always what we believe they should be, we shall at least have 
the satisfaction of knowing where we stand. And this in itself would be a signifi- 
cant step forward. For in moral matters, the beginning of wisdom (as Kant saw 
clearly) lies in recognizing that in the end the question, Who is to Judge? admits 
of but one answer: each and every one of us must judge. The end of wisdom, of 
course, lies in establishing and applying moral principles that will aid us in de- 
termining how we are to judge. 
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